How I Got Pregnant: Should Having a Child Justify a Partner’s ‘Deception’? by Haidar, Hazar
H Haidar BioéthiqueOnline 2016, 5/13
(http://bioethiqueonline.ca/5/13)
How I Got Pregnant: Should Having a Child Justify a Partner’s
‘Deception’?
RÉPONSE À - TRAVAIL CRÉATIF / RESPONSE TO - CREATIVE WORK
Hazar Haidar1,2
Reçu/Received: 8 Oct 2015 Publié/Published: 1 Jun 2016
Éditrices/Editors: Maude Laliberté & Aliya Affdal
Travail créatif discuté/Creative Work discussed: J Dwyer. How I Got Pregnant   BioéthiqueOnline 2014, 3/3
2016 H Haidar, Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License
Résumé Summary
Ce commentaire est associé au travail créatif “How I Got
Pregnant” de James Dwyer, une histoire qui soulève des
questions éthiques concernant la demande d’une femme
de bénéficier d’une assistance médicale pour tomber
enceinte, sans avoir l’intention de le dévoiler à son mari.
Dans ce commentaire, je défends l’idée que l’attitude de
cette femme trompe la confiance de son conjoint et
j’explique en quoi ses justifications, pour faire valoir sa
demande de concevoir un enfant à l’insu de son mari, sont
faibles.
This is a commentary related to the creative work by James
Dwyer entitled “How I Got Pregnant”, a story that raises
ethical issues about a woman’s request for medical
assistance to get pregnant without the intention to disclose
this to her husband. In this commentary, I argue that this
woman’s attitude breaks trust with her husband, and show
why the justifications she offered in order to argue for her
request to conceive a child without her husband’s
knowledge are flawed.
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Introduction
In his creative work “How I got pregnant” [1], James Dwyer offers us an interesting short story about a
woman’s request for medical assistance to get pregnant. Helen, the main character, asked the doctor
to try artificial insemination using a sperm donor while her husband was unaware. A discussion
between Helen and her doctor raised the issue about her intention not to disclose anything to her
husband. Helen decided to pursue her request. So, she got pregnant and delivered her long-awaited
child, Francis. This rich story offers a complexity of ethical issues related to assisted reproductive
technologies (ART), including among others, the concept and role of social parents, a woman’s right
over her own body, the right-to-know of the future child and deception.
As stated by Dwyer “the story shows that some common ethical ideas don’t quite fit the characters’
experience and the readers’ reactions”. As a reader, my first reaction was related to the issue of
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deception. Why? Maybe because this particular issue raised little attention in the academic literature
in the context of reproductive technologies or maybe because it is of great interest for me. But what I
can say is that the first question that came to my mind was particularly related to this issue. I have
wondered if having a child at all costs can justify deception.
In this commentary, I will try to answer this question by first arguing why I think that what Helen did
involves deceiving her partner (since she thinks what she did is not deceptive) by referring to a
definition of deception, and second, by providing some justifications that will be backed up by the
principles of not lying and the calculation of consequences.
Should what Helen did be considered deceptive?
In this story, when the doctor asked Helen if she intended to tell her husband that she planned to try
artificial insemination using a sperm donor, she replied: “No, there’s no need to. I’m not going to lie.
I’m just not going to tell him.” and they had the following discussion:
“Do you think your plan is a bit deceptive?”
“I could go out and have an affair. That would be deceptive. There are enough
men who want to sleep with me. Every time I wear a skirt and contact lenses to work,
more men stop by my office. But I don’t want to sleep with another guy. I’m committed
to my husband. I’m just tired of waiting. Besides, I told you, I’m not going to lie and I’m
not asking you to lie.”
“I understand, we’re not going to lie to your husband, but I wonder if we’re deceiving
him, if we’re hiding something from him.”
“So you think it’s deceptive?”
“I don’t know. I’ve never had a request like this before. I need some time to think about
it.”
By referring to her statements, we can see that Helen considers deception as a physical action.
According to her, deception is about the physical affair she would have with a man other than her
husband. Even if that might indeed be deceptive, is deception only about a physical affair? Is it not
also about a moral act? 
One of many definitions provided in the literature about deception is to intentionally cause another
person to have a false belief [2]. Additionally, both concepts of deception and lying seem to be
related. According to some authors, “in addition to requiring an intention to deceive, lying requires the
making of an untruthful assertion, as well as (or which therefore entails) a breach of trust or faith.” [3]
By applying this definition to the current context, we could note that Helen is intentionally causing her
husband to believe that his child is his genetically based on the fact that she has hidden her request
for artificial insemination. However, this definition has several limits: for instance, some authors
consider that deceiving might be inadvertent or mistaken [4,5], while others argue that deception
cannot be an inadvertent act [6,7]. The present situation shows that Helen’s act is not mistaken but is
intentional since she has thought-out, planned and pursued her decision to get pregnant, creating
therefore a false belief that the child to be born is also her husband’s. By lying to her husband, Helen
is deceiving him and based on the Kantian principle of not lying, Helen’s act would be considered
morally wrong [8]. Additionally, taking a utilitarian approach and considering the harmful
consequences of Helen’s conduct, her act of lying and deceiving could negatively influence Helen, her
husband, the child Francis, as well as their family relationships. For instance, if Helen’s husband finds
out about the way that their child was conceived, he might feel badly treated, manipulated and
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deprived from his right to be informed about the pregnancy [9], which in turn could result in mistrust
between the couple and even threaten their marriage. As for the child, an accidental discovery (such
as a genetic test) revealing that his father is not his biological father might also affect him negatively.
In addition to the psychological harm such as anger, confusion and the impact on Francis’ self-
esteem, he might also be confronted with the curiosity of obtaining information about his “biological”
identity. Consequently, this might prompt him to search for his biological father, which could result in
the disruption of his current family life [10]. Although this debate related to the “child’s right to know” or
“not to know about his genetic origins” falls outside the scope of this commentary, it is worth
mentioning as a potential consequence for Helen’s decision to hide the information related to this
conception. 
A woman’s right to control her own body: between a decision to
“terminate a pregnancy” and a decision to “get pregnant” 
Another argument that I would like to discuss is related to a woman’s right to control her own
body [11]. This argument has been frequently associated with abortion debates in order to defend a
woman’s decision to terminate a pregnancy without the partner’s permission or interference. In the
current context and for the sake of justifying her position, Helen referred to this argument in order to
compare her decision “to get pregnant” to the decision of terminating a pregnancy, exemplified by her
statement: “But don’t you believe that women should be able to control their own bodies? Women can
end a pregnancy without their husband’s permission. Why can’t they start one? Did I forfeit my rights
when I got married?” However, considering the pregnancy in the current context where both parents
are planning to have a baby, is it right to treat as morally equivalent a decision to terminate a
pregnancy without the husband’s permission (based on Helen’s right to control her own body) and a
decision to get pregnant without the husband’s knowledge? 
If we assume that Helen’s decision to terminate a pregnancy – where a foetus already exists – is
defensible based on her right to control her own body, this argument seems to be weakened in the
context of her decision to get pregnant, a situation where the foetus has not yet been conceived.
Given that there was also a mutual plan between Helen and her husband to conceive a child, even if
maybe a difference regarding the timing, should her husband not agree or/and at least have a say in
decisions about other ways to become pregnant, such as recourse to artificial insemination using his
sperm or that of a sperm donor? Further, the prospective father did not forfeit his rights to participate
in the conception process when he got married and thus arguably has the right to be informed about
the paternity of the child.
Moreover, Helen’s right to control her own body does not cover her right to take a decision to get
pregnant without her husband’s knowledge; procreation is normally a two-person endeavour where
the participation of both parents is required for conception. For this reason, I argue that the partner
also has the fundamental right to decide if he agrees to a particular parental plan [8], e.g., such as
having his own genetically related child or by being the social father. In either case, he would then
also assume his responsibilities and obligations towards the child while being fully informed about the
way that conception was performed and about the child’s origin.
Finally, perception of parenthood differs among individuals: while there are couples that decide to not
have children, there are also couples that consider parenthood to be a very precious thing. Any
decision to procreate by a couple should be a mutual decision between both persons who agreed to
assume responsibilities toward the child to be born. Helen is not justified in having a child by
deceiving her husband. At a minimum, her husband has the right to know how the pregnancy was
conceived and if he is the biological father of the child.
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